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14. ABSTRACT In the heartland of Somalia, the warring parties are still playing the game of life. Innocent Somali men, women, and children are enduring the brutality of war, with thousands of innocent lives caught in daily cross-fire between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and their Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supporters on one side, and on the other side, the Al-Shabaab organization. For over twenty years, Somalia has been the wasteland of North Africa. Peacekeepers from AMISOM, the United Nations, the European Union, Non-Government Organizations, Humanitarian Organizations, and the United States have all tried to provide stability in the country, yet, little progress has resulted. Millions of dollars have been spent, infrastructure has been built, forces have been trained, and politicians have beat the halls of capital buildings looking for international support, yet, how can we know if the Somali people are safer. Little research has been done in measuring results in this area because it's common sense to assume the worst. The worst is simply that Somalis are not any safer today than in the past. This paper examines the progress that has been made in Somalia, using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community.					
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SOMALIA

Is it Safer Now?

February 2012

In the heartland of Somalia, the warring parties are still playing the game of life. Innocent Somali men, women, and children are enduring the brutality of war, with thousands of innocent lives caught in daily cross-fire between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and their Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supporters on one side, and on the other side, the Al-Shabaab organization. For over twenty years, Somalia has been the wasteland of North Africa. Peacekeepers from AMISOM, the United Nations, the European Union, Non-Government Organizations, Humanitarian Organizations, and the United States have all tried to provide stability in the country, yet, little progress has resulted. Millions of dollars have been spent, infrastructure has been built, forces have been trained, and politicians have beat the halls of capital buildings looking for international support, yet, how can we know if the Somali people are safer. ¹ Little research has been done in measuring results in this area because it's common sense to assume the worst. The worst is simply that Somalis are not any safer today than in the past. In this research paper, I will examine the progress that has been made in Somalia, using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community. ²

CURRENT SITUATION

In the last few months, AMISOM and the TFG have been fighting alongside the forces of the government of Kenya and Ethiopia in an attempt to dislodge Al-Shabaab forces from the border area between Kenyan and Somalia. According to a recently published UN Security Report on Somalia, Kenyan and the TFG are working together militarily and have been successful in

limiting Al-Shabaab's activity in Mogadishu.³ More importantly, the UN has considered re-hating Kenya's Defense Forces under a United Nations mandate. Having this legitimacy would bring AMISOM's strength from its current level of 9800 to 11800. In the last few weeks, talks have resumed at both the UN and AMISOM to bring the AMISOM strength level to 17,000.⁴

In the political arena, the UN and African Union have been supporting the TFG in the implementation and execution of elections by August 2012. Working together with the UN, the TFG has developed a list of tasks that must be accomplished by August 2012. Adopted in September 2011, this "Political Road-map" is supposed to provide regional and civil society actors a voice in development of security, constitution, reconciliation, and good governance within Somalia; however, according to the UN report, a number of agreed deadlines have been missed. To help Somalia officials, the UN has brought in political experts, set up a tracking system, and requested progress reports on implementation of this plan.

The current situation would not be complete without providing an overview of the human rights violations and civilian turmoil occurring in Somalia. The recently released 2012 Human Rights Watch report rates Somalia is one of the worst countries in terms of civilian casualties and injuries. All warring parties have indiscriminately fired indirect fire into populated areas. Al-Shabaab continues to administer beheadings, beatings, and torture to anyone suspected of not supporting their organization or having ties with the TFG. According to Ken Menkhaus,

*"Somalia is dying. Three-quarters of a million people are at immediate risk of famine; another 750,000 are refugees in neighboring countries, and 4 million – half the total population- is in need of emergency aid...The international response has been shockingly inadequate..."*⁵

With all this mishap, the international community has tried to respond. But, before exploring what the international community has done, I will examine in the next section what authorities

and tasks does the UN and AMISOM have to work under. Before any forces are introduced into a war zone, commanders must have an end state to guide their actions; otherwise, mission creep will certainly occur, as it has in the last twenty years.

Strategic Policy and Tasks of the UN and AMISOM

The intervention and presence of UN advisors and AMISOM forces has been a critical aspect of survival for the Somali people because they provide security, assistance in the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid for NGOs, and policy support to the fragile TFG. Since its creation in January 2007, AMISOM's mission has been to protect and support the government and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, what was supposed to be a six month deployment has turned into a five year mission. Yet, despite the numerous tasks outlined in the September 2012 UN Security Council mandate, the first sentence calls for the regional and international community to help support AMISOM in the "protection of civilians in armed conflict, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict..."⁶ So, working off this strategic guidance, AMISOM has produced a set of supporting operational tasks as a guide to commanders in Somalia.

AMISOM's mandate provides supporting tasks for the creation of a stable environment where humanitarian organizations can provide support to the Somalia people, but does not *specifically require AMISOM forces to "protect" the Somalia population*. Listed below are the tasks outlined to the commanders operating in Somalia:

TASKS

- Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders.

- Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) & key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions.
- Assist in the implementation of the National Security Stabilization Programme (NSSP).
- Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.
- Monitor the security situation in areas of operation.
- Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Protect AMISOM personnel, installations and equipment, including self defense⁷

Perhaps it was an oversight or intentional of AMISOM to not specifically state that it would protect the civilian population, *but all indications are that this oversight has not created the conditions for a safe Somalia.* In the following section, I will use data from the National Counter-Terrorism Center to make an assessment whether AMISOM and the UN have created the conditions to protect the civilian population.

MEASURING THE YEARS OF CONFLICT (2010-2011)

Any research paper can be shaped to confirm any researchers hypothesis, depending on the data, that a researcher gathers, but in this case, collecting accurate casualty numbers in Somalia can be very difficult. As the report entitled, “Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response,” stated, it is difficult to account for civilian casualty numbers in Somalia due to the lack of reporting by warring parties, lack of independent verifying NGOs or organizations, and disregard of accountability by all sides of innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire.⁸

Methodologies for developing a research project on insurgent groups are often too analytical, using statistics and impressive formulas, as the basis to draw conclusions. This paper will depend on basic raw reporting figures to ensure user-friendliness and encourage applicability for future studies.⁹ The National Counter-Terrorism Center has been reporting on “terrorism” incidents

since 2004 using multiple sources, including open source reports, NGO and other neutral reporting organizations, hospital records, and other unclassified collection methods. Using the World Wide Incident Tracking System, I intend to extract data to compare events by time period, location, victim, incident-type, and perpetrator. Specifically, I have narrowed my search to the years 2010 until 3rd quarter of 2011 because the data for 4th quarter, 2011 has not been posted.

In any insurgency, the government has the responsibility of creating a safe environment for the population; otherwise, the population starts to doubt the ability of their government and will side with the insurgent group.¹⁰ Al-Shabaab's use of guerilla tactics, IEDs, targeted assassinations, and brutal beheadings has created doubt in many Somalis. Using the NCTC data, if the numbers of attacks/incidents have not significantly lowered over the last two years, we can assess that Al-Shabaab's influence and control continues despite the resources and technology, advice, and training being given to the TFG and AMISOM. Finally, this assessment does not suggest that this is the only means to measure the performance of AMISOM, but it does provide a trend that can be used to draw policy recommendations and conclusions.

Finally, several additional caveats are in order here. The assessment does not suggest a typology applicable to all military structures. Additionally, there is no way that the NCTC could have captured all the attacks or incidents occurring during the time period of this study, so drawing conclusions need to be tailored accordingly.

Attack Incidents – Strategic Viewpoint and Is there Improvement?

African Union and UN reporting suggests that Al-Shabaab's influence has decreased in many parts of Somalia and they are on the retreat. Although it's antidotal, examining the raw incident numbers would be helpful in determining whether AMISOM and the TFG have made security improvements. Figure 1¹¹ provides us a quick-look of where and how many incidents are

Incidents/Locations In Somalia				
Location	2010	2011	Total (Locations)	Top 5 Dangerous Locations
Bakool	13	16	29	
Banaadir	207	139	346	1
Bari	27	18	45	
Bay	29	28	57	
Galguduud	22	18	40	
Gedo	38	33	71	4
Galbeed	0	0	0	
Hiraan	51	24	75	
Jubbada Dhexe	5	8	13	
Jubbada Hoose	51	38	89	2
Mudug	11	31	42	
Nugaal	1	3	4	
Sanaag	0	0	0	
Shabellah Dhexe	45	36	81	3
Shabellah Hoose	11	58	69	5
Sool	0	14	14	
Togdheer	1	1	2	
Unknown	2	2	4	
Wogooy	0	0	0	
	511	450	961	

Figure 1: Incident by Location

occurring. In the 2010 study¹², the most dangerous locations were in the provinces of Banaadir,

Bay, Hiraan, Shebellah Hoose, and Jubbada Hoose (Appendix 1), while in this 2012 study, the most dangerous locations are in Banaadir, Jubbada Hoose, and Shabellah Dhexe. While Banaadir continues to be the most dangerous province, there seems to have been no change in the raw number of incidents. In 2009 and 2010, there were 219 and 207 incidents in this province. And, although incomplete, the 2011 trend suggests Banaadir will have the most number of incidents again in 2011. However, to get a country wide comparison, the number of incidents in 2010 didn't seem to decrease compared to 2009. *There were 511 incidents in 2010 and 504 in 2009. In fact, the 1st through 3rd quarter period trend of 2011, suggests that total 2011 incidents will either match or suppress those of the previous two years.*

Comparison of the years 2009 and 2010 suggests that there has been little changed in the locations where incidents are occurring and the total amounts. Why? In the UN report, the Secretary General of the UN continues to plead for resources, manpower, technology, analytical and policy support, and training.¹³ Perhaps these are some reasons, but now with the introduction of forces from Kenya and UN support organizations, this trend may reverse? Only time will tell?

Now that the evidence suggests that little has changed, perhaps there is a time-period that AMISOM can surge its resources. In Afghanistan and Iraq, operational and intelligence analysts use attack and IED data to provide the commander insight into when the Taliban and its allies are most active. Why not in Somalia? In the following section, I will compare time-periods of when incidents look to be more prevalent.

Time-Period Analysis – When to Optimize AMISOM Resources?

Military campaign developers and intelligence analysts have always sought to predict when to surge forces to provide maximum amount of resources on a weak enemy. Al-Shabaab, like any insurgent group, must continuously recruit, train, and deploy their forces throughout different parts of the year. Figure 2 provides a strategic overview of when incidents are lower, thus, suggesting times when Al-Shabaab may be more vulnerable to an organized and synchronized campaign by AMISOM and TFG forces.

Incidents/Attacks In Somalia					
	Years				
Month	2010	2011	Total (Month)	Total Quarter	Most Dangerous (Time Period)
January	53	62	115	315	1st
February	53	54	107		
March	36	57	93		
April	44	62	106	297	2nd
May	46	46	92		
June	40	59	99		
July	56	48	104	283	3rd
August	42	52	94		
September	43	42	85		
October	61	NA			
November	67	NA			
December	48	NA			
Total	589	482			

Figure 2: Incident by Time Period¹⁴

As shown in the table, the Summer and Spring 2010-2011 time periods are when incidents were lower. Comparing it to 2009-2010 in Appendix 2¹⁵, the majority of the incidents occurred in the

October through December period, second only to the July through August period. While there could be a variety of reasons for this change in incidents, the most obvious reason could be the heat, time-period when Al-Shabaab trains recruits, or when soldiers are with their families to help generate income. Little analysis has been done of Al-Shabaab tactical doctrine so this analysis attempts to look into the planning cycle of Al-Shabaab leadership.

Another aspect of whether AMISOM and TFG forces have been able to provide security is simply to analyze who is being caught in the cross-fire. Are the majority of victims innocent civilians? Or, are they military, NGOs, or some other category of victim. In the following section, I will analyze who is dying? Has there been an upswing or decrease in victims?

Victim Analysis – Who is being caught in the Cross-fire?

The United Nations, NGOs, and other humanitarian organizations have called Somalia the worst human disaster in Africa and ranked as the world's most dangerous nation out of 153 countries surveyed by the Global Peace Index.¹⁶ Civilians are dying for many reasons including being victims of street battles between warring parties, famine, and other manmade and natural disasters. But why should AMISOM and the UN care? According to the CIVIC study, Somali population may sway their support to the party that attempts to decrease civilian deaths, provide compensation, or simply cares more about innocent victims being caught the middle.

“The Strategic Impact of civilian casualties and the way in which incidents are managed is hard to overestimate – their role in shaping the perceptions, sympathies, and loyalty of the local population towards the respective warring parties is significant.”¹⁷

Over the last two years, the Somali people have been caught in the haze of street battles between AMISOM and Al-Shabaab. Figure 3 provides an overview of the type of victims being killed. It is quite obvious that the majority of the victims are not soldiers, but ordinarily people trying to escape the tragedy of war.




Figure 3: Victims Trends

An educated person may ask who and why are so many civilians dying in a conflict that has two clear sides. This is a conflict that experts say has had more suffering by the civilian population than both Afghanistan and Iraq combined. The *2012 Human Watch Report* states that both sides of this conflict are at fault¹⁸, despite the fact that both the UN and Muslim clergy have repeatedly told both sides to stop killing civilians. But, as many analysts have stated, the more civilians that are killed, the more it discredits both the TFG and AMISOM. Figure 3 clearly shows that civilian deaths far exceed any other category of

victim. Residents of Somalia, diaspora, and journalists are asking, “Why hasn’t the AMISOM improved security.”¹⁹ To answer that question, planners need realize who is conducting the majority of the civilian deaths. Figure 4 provides an overview of who are the perpetrators.




Figure 4: Perpetrator²⁰

While similar to other regions of the world, Islamic extremists have been identified as being responsible for civilian deaths; Somalia is no exception. As indicated in the graph 99% of all incidents have been initiated or involved Al-Shabaab. It is doubtful that AMISOM or the TFG would be considered a perpetrator of incidents, even, when responding to Al-Shabaab initiated attack. However, the main point of this perpetrator-initiated graph is to illustrate that Al-Shabaab seems to be unhindered and continues to

be a threat to the civilian population. Finally, to help get a better understanding of the areas where incidents are occurring, the next section will expand on the analysis completed earlier in the paper.

Geo-Spatial View – Where are the incidents occurring?

For the last five years, AMISOM and TFG forces have concentrated all of their operations in the capital and southern Somalia. But, has this thwarted incidents and stopped the violence in this area? According to a geo-spatial intelligence view of the incident locations, nothing has changed. In figure 5, this overlay clearly shows that attacks are still being conducted in southern Somalia. In spite of the majority of AMISOM being concentrated in Mogadishu, these overlays illustrate that the majority of incidents and deaths are still concentrated in these areas.




Figure 5: Overlay of Attack Locations

CONCLUSION

For the last twenty-plus years, AMISOM and the TFG have been the recipients of millions of dollars in aid, training for its soldiers, and equipping of its forces. Yet, has it been for nothing? In an attempt to answer this question, I have used data from the National Counter-Terrorism Center to assess whether the people of Somalia are safer. Rather than depending on the judgment of a Somali expert from academia, the think tanks, or some other government organization, I have used different data-sets to quantify that answer.

Using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community, I believe it's evident that the security of Somali has not improved since I last conducted a similar study in 2010. Even UN and AMISOM quarterly reports point to the lawlessness and need for the additional resources in Somalia. The international community continues to be solicited for resources by the African Union, the United Nations, and the numerous non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia.

Not to take anything away from the wonderful heavy lifting that the brave officers and soldiers of AMISOM are conducting, but, strategically, AMISOM has been a failure. Researchers will tell you that using statistics is only one way of measuring mission failure or success, but in this depressed world-wide economy, donor countries deserve to know if their resources are contributing to a more positive Somalia. Over the next few months, the TFG will be held accountable to provide for free elections and better governance. Hopefully, improved political conditions will result in a safer Somalia.

¹ Ken Menkhaus, *A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine: Enough Policy Briefing*, September 2011, 1-2.

² LTC Eloy E. Cuevas US Army, *Somalia: Living in the Storm of Conflict* <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA542734>, The author did a similar study as a student for the Naval War College in July 2010 for Professor Richard Lobban.

³ United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/AMISOM-Mandate-extended-to-Oct.-2012.pdf?bcsi_scan_24DE46460B4E2EF0=IIec4KLcqbI8viKt8dCbp/Rr7KYNAAAkGuDCQ=:1, 9 December 2011, 4.

⁴ Al Jazeera, AU troops battle al-Shabab in outer Mogadishu, URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/201212014538890650.html?bcsi_scan_24DE46460B4E2EF0=0&bcsi_scan_filename=201212014538890650.html, accessed January 22, 2012.

⁵ Menkhas, 1.

⁶ United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union in Somalia until 31 October 2012, Adopting Resolution 2010 (2011)*, 6626th Meeting, September 30, 2011. 1-2.

⁷ African Union Mission In Somalia, URL: <http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/>, accessed: January 23, 2012.

⁸ Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), *Civilian Harm In Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response*, URL: <http://www.civicworldwide.org/healing-the-wounds/somalia/somalia-report-2011>, accessed January 15, 2012, 1-2.

⁹ Cuevas, 9.

¹⁰ Rob Wise, Al-Shabaab, *Center For Strategic & International Studies, AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series*, 5-6.

¹¹ National Counter Terrorism Center Worldwide Incident Tracking System, URL: <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>, accessed January 22, 2012. Incidents compiled by author January 22, 2012.

¹² Cuevas, 12.

¹³ UN Report, 16-17.

¹⁴ Ibid, WITS, URL: <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>, accessed January 20, 2012. Incidents compiled by author, January 20, 2012.

¹⁵ Cuevas, 11.

¹⁶ Global Peace Index 2011, Institute For Economics and Peace, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/category/info-center/results-reports/>, 19.

¹⁷ CIVIC, 41.

¹⁸ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2012*, URL: <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012>, 158-160.

¹⁹ Justin Marozzi, *Somalia: AU Peackeepers need urgent help*, New African, October 2010, 44-45.

²⁰ Ibid, WITS, URL: <https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>, accessed January 20, 2012. Incidents compiled by author, January 20, 2012.

APPENDIX 1

Incidents/Locations in Somalia					
Location (By Province)	Years			Total (Locations)	Top 5 Dangerous Locations
	2007	2008	2009		
Bakool	0	5	12	17	
Banaadir	341	212	219	772	1
Bari	2	15	15	32	
Bay	16	82	41	139	2
Galguduud	1	13	13	27	
Gedo	3	6	18	27	
Hiiraan	15	31	55	101	3
Jubbada Dhexe	1	1	4	6	
Jubbada Hoose	10	15	35	60	5
Mudug	1	10	17	28	
Nugaal	2	2	2	6	
Sanaag	0	0	0	0	
Shabellah Dhexe	1	11	21	33	
Shabellah Hoose	17	36	44	97	4
Sool	0	1	1	2	
Togdheer	0	1	0	1	
Unknown	4	1	6	11	
Woqooy	0	0	1	1	
Galbeed	0	2	0	2	

Source: NCTC World Wide Incident Tracking System
<https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0>

APPENDIX 2

Incidents/Attacks in Somalia						
	Years					
Month	2007	2008	2009	Total (Month)	Total Quarter	Most Dangerous Time Period
January	5	34	41	80	321	3rd
February	38	46	45	129		
March	30	44	38	112		
April	7	30	42	79	311	4rd
May	32	40	50	122		
June	42	41	27	110		
July	58	24	32	114	361	2nd
August	72	28	43	143		
September	38	35	31	104		
October	46	30	38	114	366	1st
November	20	50	51	121		
December	26	42	63	131		
Total	414	444	501	1359		